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With the rise in the number of devices in the Internet of Things (IoT), the number of
malicious devices will also drastically increase. Smart cities’ decisions are based on data
being collected by IoT devices in real-time, of which a connected-vehicle system is included.
Behaviors such as malicious data injection can significantly impact connected vehicles. To
aid in combating this threat, monitoring smart city and connected vehicle’s sensor data
will allow for construction of a behavioral model. Implementing machine learning will aid
in constructing a standard behavior such that any device that begins to malfunction or
behave maliciously can be detected and mitigated in real-time. This behavioral analysis will
be further applied to supplement trust management approaches such that a more accurate
value can be associated with the device’s perceived trustworthiness without the need to rely
on a majority consensus.
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The rapid growth of connected devices comprising the Internet of Things (IoT) is trans-
forming traditional elements of city life into next-generation intelligent smart cities where
decisions are based on data being collected by IoT devices in real-time. Among the key
components contributing to smart cities’ initiatives is the intelligent transportation system
(ITS), which contains but is not limited to connected vehicles. The technology behind con-
nected vehicles will enable vehicles to communicate with their peers, roadside units (RSUs),
and other infrastructure to share vital transportation information such as current road con-
ditions, congested traffic, and vehicular collisions [3, 4].
However, as the number of connected devices increases, the number of malicious devices
in the system will also likely rise. The cybersecurity requirements of smart cities are distinct
from conventional and past security issues, as they are constantly evolving because of new
trends in technology and use cases [5]. The network setup can raise another challenge where
frequent topology changes and high mobility characteristics of connected vehicles can create
additional challenges in which cryptographic solutions cannot perform as well as expected
so attackers can easily overtake authorized and authenticated users [6].
Because of the cybersecurity challenges that smart cities suffer from, it was necessary to
create a new approach that sought to build trust between devices in an untrusted environment
[6]. One solution offered is the design and implementation of trust management systems,
in which devices will interact with one another and upon analysis of the data received, a
device will learn to either trust or not to trust specific devices [7]. The decision to trust or
to not trust is driven by the other device’ or devices’ trust value(s), where a higher trust
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value indicates that the device has sent overall accurate messages while a lower trust could
imply that the device is malfunctioning or is acting maliciously [7]. Trust management
systems [7–10] enable devices to more quickly determine which other devices are sending
accurate data and which are transmitting malicious or inaccurate data, based upon this
trust value. The decision to increase or decrease another device’s trust value is determined by
using the device’s own sensors to analyze the accuracy of the message, where the neighboring
devices will then come to a consensus or agreement on the factual representation of the data.
If the devices agree on the validity of the message then the initial device’s trust value will be
increased and conversely decreased if the message is deemed inaccurate. By enabling trust
within smart cities, devices will be able to quickly accept data and execute decisions with a
level of confidence that the data received is accurate.
As a result of the fundamentally untrusted environment that is a smart city and connected
vehicles, it is difficult for vehicles to evaluate the credibility of received messages. Trust man-
agement systems have been shown to mitigate threats [6], however there are unique threats
targeting the consensus mechanisms of trust management approaches such as colluding at-
tacks [11], in which vehicles who behave maliciously will always not be removed from the
system but instead rewarded for all coming to a majority consensus on the malicious data.
Thus, relying solely on a majority consensus of devices is often not enough to mitigate
threats, and therefore it is both critical and urgent to design and implement a solution that
is capable of monitoring the data and behavior of such devices.
Through monitoring of connected vehicles’ driving statistics, a localized behavioral model
can be constructed that will accurately represent the standard behavior of vehicles driving
in this area. This behavioral model will allow for future data to be compared to determine
whether the data reasonably fits the expected behavior for that area. The results from this
analysis of data will aid in the calculation of device behavior that can be further applied
to more accurately represent the device’s perceived trustworthiness in the system, that in
its current state relies on a majority consensus instead of the accuracy of the data itself.
However, the need to remove threats against the majority consensus mechanism in cur-
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rent trust management approaches requires another method of determining data accuracy,
providing motivation for machine learning to be implemented to construct this behavioral
model. Given the numerous sensors and the massive amounts of data necessary for a con-
nected vehicle network [12], machine learning will be capable of compiling the information to
form the standard behavioral model that can be used as a basis for future data comparisons.
This machine-learning approach allow for a more rapid detection and mitigation of threats
which will further enable the real-time security needs of smart cities and connected vehicle
networks.
1.1 Research Questions
In this thesis, we address the following research questions:
• Is it possible for a vehicle’s behavior to be monitored and assessed in evaluating the
trust in the network?
• What data is necessary to determine the overall behavior of a vehicle?
• How can machine learning enhance traditional trust management approaches?
• How will this behavioral analysis model assist in mitigating threats better than tradi-
tional trust management approaches?
• What level of accuracy is necessary for the behavioral analysis model to mitigate
threats?
• What machine learning algorithm will best meet the real-time requirements of smart
cities?
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1.2 Motivation and Contributions
For trust management approaches to be successful, there is a critical and urgent need to
detect and mitigate threats in real time. Emerging technologies such as smart cities and
connected vehicles require novel cybersecurity approaches that are able to meet the needs
that these advanced technologies require, trust management had proven its ability to satisfy
these needs [7–10]. However, it is vital that trust management systems adapt to prevent
new threats and detect and mitigate existing threats in real time. To accomplish this and
to allow for a expeditious reaction to malicious behavior, the contributions of this work can
be summarized as follows:
• Construct of a behavioral model: Constructing a behavioral model involves mon-
itoring each vehicle’s driving statistics to gathering a understanding of a specific geo-
graphical location and the typical behavior of the vehicles that participate there. The
monitoring of driving statistics is vital to the real-time nature the system provides be-
cause to detect and mitigate threats in real-time, the system needs to have the most
recent data available. Collecting data must be done for a small geographical area so
that the system does not become impacted, which would negatively impact the real-
time needs of the system. This behavioral model forms the foundation to the remainder
of the thesis and can be expanded upon by creating many different behavioral models
each corresponding to their own geographical area.
• Develop a method to compare current behavior to the known behavioral
model: Using the behavioral model and the continued monitoring of vehicle driving
statistics, the system will then be capable of creating a behavioral pattern identification
process in which a vehicle’s current behavior will be compared against the known be-
havioral model. Any vehicle that does not reasonably model the standard or expected
behavior can be assumed to be an anomaly. These anomalies will provide the means
of detection in this system, which will in turn lead to a mitigation process. Further,
classification of the behavior is critical to the evaluation of these anomalies, because
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devices could be malicious/malfunctioning and thus classifying their behavior will aid
in mitigation of such threats. The analysis accomplished will provide critical insight
into the detection and mitigation of threats in the system.
• Formulate behavior-based trust mechanism To further aid in the determination
of the perceived trustworthiness of a vehicle, a behavior-based formula will be used to
derive a distinct value that directly correlates to a given vehicle’s likelihood of following
the established pattern. This behavioral value can then be used in future implementa-
tions of trust management systems to more accurately define and calculate any vehicle’s
overall trustworthiness.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. A brief discussion of key background
information in Chapter 2 is followed by related work in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the
simulation and data collection approach. Methodology and experimentation are described
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 describes the evaluation and experimental results for the system.




This chapter explains key ideas discussed throughout this thesis. The concepts covered
here are the Internet of Things and Smart Cities in Section 2.1, Trust Management Systems
in Section 2.2, Machine Learning in Section 2.3, and the threat model in Section 2.4.
2.1 IoT and Smart Cities
As technology progresses, it is becoming an integral part of every day life. Businesses,
communities, and governments all rely on the internet to transmit information. Any device
connected to the internet is a part of the Internet of Things. While they all have their
individual purposes, the ability to transmit data across the internet is what unites them
[13,14]. There are, at present, an estimated 24 billion IoT devices [15]. IoT devices come in
all shapes and sizes, such as a smart watch, smart refrigerator, security systems, smartphones,
and even devices whose sole purpose is to collect and transmit data (such as thermometers,
infrared detectors, motion detectors, or accelerometers).
2.1.1 Smart City
In [16], the following definition is offered: “A smart city is a framework, predominantly
composed of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), to develop, deploy and
promote sustainable development practices to address growing urbanization challenges.” A
smart city thus is a conglomeration of various devices that communicate to enable safer and
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Figure 2.1 Smart city demonstrating how various devices are able to communicate through, vehicle-to-vehicle,
vehicle-to-RSU, and vehicle-to-infrastructure to aid in efficient operations of the city.
more efficient operations [17]. Smart cities are composed of a new class of devices such as
smart traffic lights, which have been shown to alleviate traffic [18]. Roadside Units (RSUs)
are devices that are more computationally powerful than standard IoT devices; RSUs can
collect the data from other devices and help coordinate the city such that it operates more
efficiently [3, 4, 19]. Specific to this thesis, smart cities’ initiatives include an intelligent
transportation system (ITS), which is composed of connected vehicles (see Figure 2.1).
2.1.2 Connected Vehicles
Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) allow connected vehicles to communicate with other
devices to share information regarding driving patterns or road conditions [3, 4].
To create a safer driving environment connected vehicles will need vast amounts of data
in order to make efficient and safe decisions for it’s passengers as well as members of the
city. To accomplish this connected vehicles will need methods of communicating with the
infrastructure that is dedicated to the operations of VANET-ITS. These communication
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protocols include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) enabling vehicles to communicate with one another
and vehicle-to-everything (V2X), which allow the vehicles to communicate with all device’s
in the smart city such as RSUs [20].
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) describes vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communication as “Information between nearby vehicle to potentially warn drivers
about dangerous situations that could lead to a crash” [12]. While connected vehicles are
not currently popular with car manufacturers, it is estimated that to transform a standard
vehicle into a connected vehicle would cost approximately $350 [12] to equip the vehicle with
the necessary communication devices and sensors. Some of these sensors include ultrasonic
sensors, cameras, and radars, which when used together should provide more information
about the surrounding area than what a driver is capable of seeing of their own.
2.2 Trust Management Systems
New technologies such as smart cities and connected vehicles often require novel meth-
ods of cybersecurity to protect the users from malicious acts. One solution to address the
cybersecurity needs of connected vehicles is through the application of a trust management
system [7–9]. Trust management systems are a method which rewards or punishes devices
based on how they operate in the network. Each device has a trust value that corresponds
to the observed trustworthiness based on historical interactions with other devices in the
network. Devices interact and will evaluate the accuracy of the data each receives. If the
data is determined to be accurate, then the other device will be rewarded with a higher
trust value, if the data is inaccurate or malicious their trust value will be decreased [7]. This
method of a group evaluating messages for accuracy is known as a majority consensus [21].
This majority consensus comes with an attendant problem: colluding attacks. This is when
a group of devices all act maliciously and will agree on the accuracy of the data thus boosting
their trust values [22].
As previously stated, smart cities require decisions to be made in real time (which means
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in our context sufficiently fast that decision-making can improve the overall operation of
the smart city). But because of the untrusted nature of smart cities, devices cannot blindly
accept data as such data has the potential for negative side effects. Trust management offers
the ability to only accept data that comes from devices with a high trust factor so that data
received is most likely accurate (however a high trust factor is not guarantee that the data is
100% accurate even if the other device has a perfect trust factor). This is a because history
is unable to predict the future; any device has the capability of turning malicious, making
it even more vital to develop a modernized solution.
2.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning has risen in popularity in recent years, especially with the growing
interest in data analysis. Merriam Webster defines machine learning as “the process by which
a computer is able to improve its own performance by continuously incorporating new data
into an existing statistical model” [23]. This means that, through a mathematical model, a
computer is able to be trained to critically analyze data such that it can make predictions of
future outputs or provide a more concise explanation of the outputs without having to look
through mass amounts of data. There are two types of machine learning: supervised and
unsupervised [?]. Supervised machine learning is where the developer will create the training
set and manually define the data such that the machine learning algorithm will be able to
identify patterns based upon these. On the other hand, unsupervised machine learning
involves algorithms where the computer will groups the data together automatically [24].
There are many different applications for machine learning, some of the more popular
include: speech recognition, computer vision, pattern recognition [25].
Machine learning terminology used throughout this thesis is as follows:
• True Positive and False Positive: A true positive is where a model correctly identifies
an outcome, while false positives occur when a model predicts an outcome which does
not actually occur.
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• Training/Fitting: In order for machine learning to be able to make prediction, it must
learn the data that it will be operating on. This learning process is referred to as
training or fitting the model.
• Inlier and Outlier: After the machine learning algorithm has been trained certain algo-
rithms are designed to determine if any new data that is input in the system matches
the data that the algorithm was trained on. Data which does not match is an outlier,
and conversely data which matches is an inlier.
Figure 2.2 Visual representation of how anomaly detection algorithms (One-class SVM, Robust Covariance,
Isolation forest, and LOF) determine if data is an inlier or outlier (adopted from [1])
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2.3.1 Anomaly Detection
One specific class of machine learning is known as anomaly detection, which is common
utilized, for instance, in cybersecurity [26,27]. Like other types of machine learning, anomaly
detection requires training on “standard” data. The algorithm will learn patterns and gain
a baseline understanding of the data [28]. With the algorithm understanding what the
standard behavior is, anything that differs sufficiently will be flagged as an anomaly (which
can lead to a number of different mitigation techniques such as having a human take a look
to determine what would’ve caused such an event). Figure 2.2 demonstrates how different
anomaly detection models group data points and shows that any data point not inside that
grouping is considered to be an outlier (that is, an anomaly).
Figure 2.3 Visual representation of how classification machine learning algorithms group data together such
that any point that is mapped to a specific location is classified based on that grouping (adopted from [2])
2.3.2 Classification
Another area of machine learning is called either classifiers or classification algorithms.
These are generally supervised models, where the algorithm will be trained on datasets that
have a flag that corresponds to the specific class of data that it represents. Upon training, any
new data that is input into the machine-learning algorithm will be labeled with the class to
which it belongs [29]. Classification algorithms accomplish this through the grouping of data;
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this is necessary because it provides a distinction between different subsets of data such that
new data can be classified according to its relation to the subset [29], a visual representation
of this can be seen in Figure 2.4. An example of a classifier is image recognition software. If
a machine learning algorithm were to be trained on images, in which each image was labeled
corresponding to the animal that was pictured, then if you were to input another picture of
an animal, then the machine learning algorithm would recognize the image and output the
type of animal.
2.4 Threat Model
A number of malicious attacks affect the way IoT entities communicate with each other
and could have an impact of the trust building in a given network. This can affect the
decision-making, which could lead to negatively effecting human lives. In this section, the
threat model is presented, which comprise of a number of attacks with different targeted
effect on the system, including breakout fraud, illusion-based attacks, and colluding. In the
future, we will look into other threat models that will affect IoT enabled systems. The
purpose of a behavioral trust monitoring is to aid in prevention of attacks that can occur in
the system. Thus, by implementing this approach the following attacks can have minimal
effect.
2.4.1 Breakout Fraud
Breakout fraud attack occurs when a device attempt to first build trust in the network
through providing accurate information, but, at a given point in time, said device will begin
acting maliciously by transmitting false data to other devices. This attack aims to take
advantage of the fact that the device has earned a high trust value, implying that other
devices in the network will most likely accept its data. At such a juncture, the malicious
device will be able to successfully inject malicious data into the system, which can negatively
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impact the operations of the network.
2.4.2 Selective Behavior
Because of to the highly dynamic nature, connected vehicles can act maliciously with
a high possibility that they randomly switch from sending accurate messages to inaccurate
messages, and back again. Selective behavior attacks seek to maintain a high trust value such
that, upon injecting malicious data, it is more likely for the data to be accepted (such that
other devices will apply this data for a decision-making process). However, upon evaluating
these messages, the vehicle’s trust will be lowered. Thus, the vehicle will opt to switch back
to sending accurate messages for a short period of time. This variety of attack could be
launched through randomly sending true and false messages (mixed behavior), or it can be
done on a periodic schedule (flip-flopping).
2.4.3 Illusion-based Attacks
Illusion-based attacks represent a threat that occurs when vehicles have knowledge of the
data that relates to critical messages in order to force their data to model those critical
messages. This means that the malicious vehicle creates the illusion of a critical incident,
even though the incident did not occur. This attack is especially dangerous since it has the
potential to deceive protocols to prevent the injection of malicious data. By creating an
illusion-based attack and circumventing protection protocols, the smart city would accept
the data and be inclined to make decisions based on this new information. But, because
this information is actually inaccurate, the smart city or connected-vehicle network could
potentially make decisions that would negatively impact the overall condition of the network.
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2.4.4 Colluding Attacks
In traditional trust management implementations using a majority-based consensus mech-
anism [11], there is the potential for a colluding attack or an overrule of the majority attack.
This occurs when the any number of malicious devices reach consensus and the summation of
those devices’ trust values outweigh the actual trustworthy devices (such that the malicious
information is accepted as accurate). One example is as follows: one device has a 100%
trust value while another four malicious devices each have 26% trust. If the four vehicle
with lower trust agreem, then the weighted trust values of those is higher than the trust
value of the one telling the truth; thus, the consensus has now been compromised. This is an
serious problem with traditional trust management approaches, smart cities and connected
vehicles rely on the system being able to make real-time decisions when necessary. By not
detecting the presence of malicious devices in the network, the malicious device or devices
will have artificially inflated trust values, which can be used to propagate their malicious
data throughout the network. Thus, causing the system to be unable to trust device(s) with
high trust this attack has effectively shut down trust management system(s).
2.5 Concept of Operations
In a smart city with VANET-ITS [3,4], such as connected vehicles, there must be a certain
infrastructure setup which aids in the communication of vehicles. This will be divided into
two parts: vehicles and stationary nodes (RSUs). Since these smart and connected vehicles
are driving in the city, they will be using their sensors to detect information regarding
current road conditions, this information will be transmitted to the RSUs (such that critical
information can be extracted and used by the smart city [19]).
First, these vehicles will need to be equipped with sensors such that the vehicles are able
to detect information pertaining to the road conditions. As stated above, these sensors can
be devices such as ultrasonic sensors, cameras, or radars, which, when used together, will
collaborate to provide information such that other vehicles on the road can make informed
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Figure 2.4 In this figure the traffic light is the RSU, the vehicles will be reporting their observations and
data to this RSU as it is the closest in proximity. Each vehicle has its own trust value available such that
informed decisions can be made based upon the trustworthiness of the data.
decisions [12]. Further, the vehicles must be equipped with an On-board Unit (OBU) that
is used to enable for communication between the vehicle, other vehicles, and the smart-city
infrastructure. These OBUs will be composed of Directed Short Range Distance (DSRC)
technology that has been shown to satisfy vehicle-to-vehicle communication requirements
such as rate of transfer and distances between devices [30].
There also need to be stationary nodes forming a collection of Road Side Units (RSUs),
which, as stated previously, are more computationally powerful. This means that most of
the data processing and analysis will be conducted on these devices [3, 4]. RSUs will be
located throughout the city such that each RSU is able to monitor a small area and when
able to inter-communicate to complete coverage of the entire smart city [19]. Having multiple
RSUs has been shown to reduce delay of messages and to increase the delivery ratio, while
simultaneously reducing the number of retransmissions that vehicles must conduct to ensure






In our context, trust is based on the history of interactions and the validity of the informa-
tion exchanged between network entities [7–9]. Managing trust in the network has received
significant attention since it can provide a dynamic layer of security where devices in the net-
work will build a bond based on their interactions, ensuring that data can be transmitted in
the network and accepted with confidence that it came from a trustworthy device [9,10,31].
Several trust management schemes have been proposed, including entity-based where trust
is based on the device itself, data-based based upon the data that is being sent, and hybrid
trust, which is a combination of both the authenticity of the device and the information
being sent [6, 32].
One area of interest in cyber-physical systems is connected vehicles [32–36]. Compared to
static networks, the dynamic nature of connected vehicles requires a distributed system that
enables vehicles to gather and share information toward building trust in the network as they
move from one place to another (this trust building can be achieved through collaboration
between the connected vehicles and fixed roadside units) [37].
The work presented in [31] discussed the idea of using a “lead” vehicle acts as the primary
source of truth for the network. In this work, the lead vehicles are only emergency response
vehicles that are given a 100% trust value. In trust-based solutions, the lead vehicle is
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as vulnerable to outside attacks as any other vehicle in the system and thus should not be
blindly trusted. Therefore, a way to have a distributed consensus to verify the data collected,
and corresponding trust values, is required for the system to operate in a secure manner.
Kerr et al. provided an analysis of unique trust models and demonstrate how each deal
with an adversarial model showing how the trust management system is capable of dealing
with attacks.The threats provided in this work include injected messages where malicious
vehicles would purposefully inject bad data into the network and Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks that would flood the vehicles with data such that the vehicles would be unable to
process all the information.
Previous work has proposed solutions for trust management implementation in Vehicle
Ad Hoc Network-Intelligent Transportation Systems (VANET-ITS) (e.g., [32–36]). Yang et
al. proposed a decentralized system, claiming that a centralized system is impractical for the
growth that a VANET-ITS would require [32]. Another drawback of a centralized system is
the massive overhead that could be caused if several vehicles should be communicating with
the central node at once. By having several roadside units (RSUs) located throughout a city,
each area within it can be divided appropriately (e.g., load balanced and/or geographically).
Therefore, the processing load will be reasonably balanced. Further, the authors continued
by proposing trust-factor calculations where each vehicle begins with a neutral value, and,
as messages are passed between vehicles the trust value will be increased or decremented
based on the accuracy of messages. The method for evaluating the accuracy of a message is
based on the experiences that other vehicles in the network have had with a given message.
The critical drawback of this approach is the scenario in which there are several malicious
vehicles in the network and these vehicles collude to evaluate their messages as accurate.




Another study shows how humans evaluate a situational form of trust [38], where trust
is based on the current environment that the person is experiencing. The study examines
how an individual’s trust will change in what is called global virtual teams (where team
members are not colocated) in the information systems field. It shows that a person’s initial
trustworthiness or perception of trustworthiness of the team members has a greater impact
in the formation of trust. With this, it was generally found that a higher trust between
team members led to more frequent communications (as it assures everyone is completing
the necessary tasks) [38]. This study shows that if a team member does not initially prove
themselves, then the overall trust of the team member is affected, and the team member
struggles to gain trust later.
3.2 Behavior Analysis
Another study conducted in an IoT environment has demonstrated that a behavioral
analysis of IoT devices can be implemented even with limited resources [39]. To accomplish
this, the authors implemented a lead node that monitors the network traffic metadata that
devices send. Data such as the source IP address, the destination IP address, the MAC
address, and the port number, etc are extracted as features where the lead node then stores
the data on a behavior monitor blockchain. Using this data and associated features a machine
learning model was built to analyze the authenticity of the message. While the authenticity
is important, this would only prevent attacks which an outside actor attempts to harm the
system and would not mitigate threats from actors inside the network.
3.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning algorithms have been shown to aid in the cybersecurity requirements of
smart cities [40–42]. Alrashdi et al. describe the challenges of implementing machine learning
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algorithms within smart cities such as limited resources of devices or the heterogeneous
nature of IoT (which will lead to a higher false positive ratio resulting from differences
in devices). Notwithstanding heterogeneity, their work shows that the implementation of
machine learning can enhance smart cities intrusion detection systems (IDS) for certain
threats such as DoS, Worms or malicious programs installed to computers, Backdoors (which
are vulnerabilities in specific systems that allow for unauthorized access), and so on. Garcia
et al. state that, in traditional systems, authentication and confidentiality are satisfied by
cryptographic solutions. However, because of the dynamic nature of wireless networks and
smart cities, cryptographic solutions are insufficient because an attacker could capture a
node, effectively bypassing such measures. This threat has led to the study of implementing
machine learning for prevents attacks on smart cities.
3.3.1 Anomaly Detection
One specific class of machine learning is used to achieve anomaly detection; a common
application for anomaly detection is in cybersecurity [26, 27]. Anomaly detection requires
training on “standard” data, where the model will then learn patterns and have a baseline
understanding of the data [28].
Garcia et al. implemented different anomaly detection models, supervised and unsuper-
vised, such as local outlier factor and support vector machines to see which would lead to
better detection of threats [41]. Specifically, the authors implemented Mahalanobis Distance
(MD), Local Outlier Factor (LOF), Hierarchical Clustering, and Support Vector Machines
(SVM), which are all anomaly detection algorithms that will group the expected data to-
gether such that any data point which does map to the expected data is determined to be an
anomaly. In particular, MD is a measurement of the distance between two points such that
it is able to measure a new points distance from the mean of the original data set [43]. LOF
is another measured distance-based algorithm however the numerical scale for determining
outlierness is adjustable [44]. Hierarchical Clustering and SVMs both work by means of
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plotting data points and then clustering those data points [45, 46]. For anomaly detection
purposes, if any new point is mapped outside of the cluster then the data is considered an
anomaly. Through the implementations of different machine learning algorithms, the team
concluded that the SVM implementation was best suited for the data and accuracy which
they were pursuing. However, the authors were limited in their results since they worried
about the overhead inherent with a high number of false positives; to combat this possibility,
they accepted a lower accuracy in their detection algorithm.
Another study presents a two-tier anomaly detection approach [42]. The first tier of
machine learning in this aspect was dimensional reduction, which would then feed into the
classification algorithm (Naive Bayes). The output of this first tier would be the initial stages
of anomaly detection, which has the second tier further classifying data determined not to
be an anomaly. This second tier’s purpose is to enable the system to make more intelligent
decisions based upon the data through the use of a K Nearest Neighbors algorithm. While
this two-tiered approach is able to process data more efficiently than a single-tiered approach,
its primary purpose is to offload the classification of standard or normal data to another
classifier, which imposes less computational demand on the first machine learning algorithm.
3.3.2 Classification
Another area of machine learning is called classifiers or classification algorithms. These
are generally supervised models, where the algorithm will be trained on datasets that have
a flag that corresponds to the specific class of data that it represents. Upon training, any
new data that is input into the machine learning algorithm will be labeled with the class of
which it belongs to [29].
Other studies have been conducted that implement machine learning classification of
smart city data, Chin et al. compiled weather sensor data from a smart city and attempted
to classify the data such that weather predictions could be made [47]. Through testing of
Naive Bayesian, J48 Tree, and Nearest Neighbor Classifiers, the authors were able to predict
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100% of the cases tested: rainfall and temperature comparisons, thus showing that classifiers
have a positive effect when it comes to analyze data to make better predictions in a smart
city.
Brisimi et al. implemented machine learning algorithms such as SVMs, logistic regression,
adaboost, and random forests to detect objects in the road [48]. Using an anomaly detection
algorithm first to determine if there was a bump in the road, it would then feed into the
classification algorithm to determine if the bump was from a pot hole, a road patch, or a
sunk casting. With an accuracy of 86% through 88% the classification of bumps successfully
enabled city officials to prioritize which roads need fixing.
3.4 Observations
Based upon the literature review, traditional trust management systems are only con-
cerned with the trust values. This is often not enough because of how heavily these ap-
proaches rely on a consensus of the data giving way to threats that directly target trust
management implementations such as breakout fraud and colluding attacks. Trust manage-
ment implementations also do not meet the real-time needs that smart cities require. It often
takes several instances of malicious behavior before the system can safely and effectively pun-
ish or remove devices that suddenly begin acting maliciously. Thus, it is vital to find a new
implementation that can better prevent threats to smart cities and connected vehicles, while
also maintaining the ability to process and punish malicious actors in real-time.
Machine learning has been shown to accurately detect and predict outcomes based on
sensor data from devices within the smart city. Garcia et al. showed that anomaly detection
was able to aid in the detection of threats in the system, but because of to the overhead
associated with false positives, the authors accepted a lower accuracy rating. Pajouh et al.
implemented a two-tier machine learning approach, which was able to detect anomalies while
also using a classification algorithm to aid with the overhead of false positives.
Thus, it is both critical and urgent to design, develop, and implement a trust management
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approach that is capable of monitoring connected vehicles driving statistics to detect threats
in real-time. While simultaneously being able to mitigate these threats based upon the




In this chapter, the sources of the data collection and generation process from this thesis
will be discussed. 4.1 discusses vehicle-to-vehicle communications. Section 4.2 covers SUMO,
the program used to simulate vehicle driving statistics. Messages generated are described in
Section 4.3. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 4.4.
4.1 V2V communications
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) describes vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communication messages as basic safety messages (BSMs) that correspond to mes-
sages passed between vehicles regarding dynamic information such as headings, speed, and
location [12]. Further, there are other safety applications that depend on the sensors with
which connected vehicles are equipped. Potential messages or warnings include the following
(as defined in [12]):
• Intersection Movement Assist (IMA): IMA alerts drivers when it is unsafe to
merge into an intersection.
• Left Turn Assist (LTA): LTA warns the driver that it is unsafe to make a left turn
as there is oncoming traffic and thus a potential for collision.
• Emergency Electronic Brake Light: A device that alerts other vehicles when a
driver is applying the brakes. This is useful when the front vehicle might not be visible
to the follower vehicle because of a blind curve or severe weather conditions.
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• Forward Collision Warning: Warns the driver of potential collision with the leading
vehicle. Such a warning would also be beneficial to other drivers and infrastructure
because it is a measurement of how close vehicles are following.
• Do-not-pass warning: Communication warning following vehicle that it is not safe to
pass. This is attributed to a number of reasons (such as oncoming traffic is approaching
and so it is not safe to pass at present).
If every vehicle had the necessary sensors and the ability to produce warnings messages,
the NHTSA predicts that IMA and LTA will prevent between 400,000 and 600,000 crashes;
190,000 to 270,000 injuries; and save close to 1,000 lives each year. These technologies could
prevent nearly 80% of all non-alcohol related incidents [12], making it imperative to protect
the data that is being transmitted between these vehicles.
With the potential benefits that come from V2V communication, it is crucial to ensure
the security of the V2V messages (since without it any malicious actor can impersonate
or eavesdrop on the communications between vehicles) [49]. Using asymmetric encryption
through a public key infrastructure has been shown to be an effective means for the security
of V2V communications [49,50]. However, the time requirements did not allow for real-time
processing of messages when the number of vehicles increased. This thesis seeks to add a
dynamic layer of security that better meets the real-time needs of connected vehicle so the
study of the encryption, authenticity, and integrity of V2V messages are out of scope.
4.2 Simulation of Urban Mobility
Because connected vehicles being a relatively new research area, and few exist in produc-
tion environments, real-world data is not readily available enough for the demands of this
thesis. Thus through the usage of the Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO) it is possible
to accurately simulate large scale road networks with an abundance of cars where at each
time step data is logged and output [51, 52]. This output can be parsed to extract features
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that is described in more detail in subsection 4.3.
SUMO is an open source program developed by a German Aerospace Center in 2001 as
a basic traffic simulation package [52]. Since then SUMO has become feature packed with
many different packages that aid in traffic simulation.
SUMO allows for the ability to design your own custom maps with the neteditor tool
and accept many different sources as input such as a map obtained from OpenStreetMap
(OSM) [52]. OSM is a user generated street map that is capable of being exported in a
way that maintains the data such as street names and other geographical features. SUMO
includes tools that are able to convert this OSM exported map into a format that SUMO
is able to process [53]. This allows users to be able to load custom maps of cities from all
around the world.
SUMO is also capable of handling different routing protocols and generating vehicles on
demand, for the desired map, that allows for the possibility of creating numerous unique
simulations that can accurately represent real-world traffic patterns. SUMO also comes with
a suite of tools which includes one capable of generating a random number of vehicles with
completely random routes allowing for dynamic navigation patterns [51, 52]. This provides
the ability to obtain unique information for each simulation, providing a wider range of data.
The simulation aspect of SUMO is microscopic meaning that the simulation tracks each
individual vehicle by a unique identifier and each vehicle’s route is described in a config-
uration file [52]. This allows for the potential to completely fine tune the simulation such
that vehicles will travel the path that the developer creates. SUMO is also described as a
time-discrete simulation that means that it is capable of manually defining the time step at
intervals ranging from 1 second to 1 millisecond [51]. This time setting will determine the
step length of outputs such that one simulation can be as coarse or granular as desired.
SUMO is comprised of a command line tool as well as a Graphical User Interface (GUI),
while the command line tool is able to run and output the exact same as the GUI, the GUI
offers a better user experience through customized visuals and the ability to interact with
scenarios like traffic lights and re-routing of vehicles [51]. When a new simulation begins
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Figure 4.1 Example showing Chattanooga, TN Market street visualized in a SUMO’s GUI simulation. Ve-
hicles are represented by the yellow triangles, as well as traffic lights being visible at each intersection.
vehicles will be staggered into the system, one entering at each new time step. Each vehicle
will have it’s route defined in the configuration file and the vehicle will continue on this route
until it exits the map. When all vehicles leave the system the program will end and the data
will be saved into its corresponding XML files, where XML is an extensible markup language
that is organized in a tree structure such that information is related hierarchically [54].
Based upon different arguments that can be applied to the simulation, SUMO is capable
of producing numerous outputs [55]. Such outputs include information such as the position
and speed of all the vehicles, as well as emission values, trajectory data of the vehicles, and
surrogate safety measures which is information directly related to safety measurements such
as braking rates. There also exist lane values that correspond to the edges or lanes in the
simulation, it is capable of outputting emission measurements for that lane, the noise level
of the road, even how many vehicles were on the road at a particular instance.
Example SUMO simulation data can be found in Figure 4.2.
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4.3 Message Generation
According to the NHTSA recommendations, SUMO is capable of generating reports in-
cluding the numerous features such as speed, position, acceleration, braking, etc. These
features can also as seen in Figure 4.2.
Between NHTSA’s information regarding V2V communication and SUMOs simulation
and data capabilities, these features will be used to monitor the driving statistics of each
vehicle in the simulation. In addition to these features, the data will also contain a rank
or message that correlates the driving statistics to warning (or basic safety messages) and
incident messages. Table 4.1 shows the correlation of message ranks to a particular V2V
communication message.
For the purposes of this thesis, these V2V communications will be manually defined. A
message rank 0 does not correspond to any message in particular. This form of message
does not have any impact into the system but is implemented such that the vehicle is able
to transmit its current driving statistics to the infrastructure so that the smart city is aware
of the current statistics of drivers on the road.
Figure 4.2 SUMO simulation data snapshot showing the simulation time (sec), the vehicle ID, the vehicle’s
position, speed, location (x,y), acceleration, speed, brake rate and the message being reported by that vehicle
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Table 4.1 Communication messages are categorized into ranks based upon the severity of the information
present in the message. 7 ranks are presented, starting from rank 0 being a no information to be shared, all
the way to rank 6 providing critical information alerting others of the detection of a car crash.
Rank V2V Message
0 No Message - No information related data available.
1 General Alert - Corresponding to specific sensor data such as rain detection.
2 Object on shoulder - Alerts others of an object detected on the shoulder of the road.
3 Change in driving patterns - A vehicle alerting others of an upcoming change in driving patterns.
4 Object in road - Incident message informing others of an object detected on the road.
5 Emergency vehicle - Message regarding the detection of an approaching emergency vehicle.
6 Car Collision - Incident message alerting others of a car collision.
Warning messages (ranks 1-3) will represent NHTSA’s basic safety messages. These will
be messages that should not warrant any drastic changes in driving patterns, but more so for
the other drivers and infrastructure to be made aware of the current environment. In real-
world applications, these messages could also be derived from another sensor. Specifically,
rain detectors, a light detection for headlights, detection of ice, etc could be used as Message
1 or general alerts. A message with rank 2 might originate from an ultrasonic sensor or
camera that is able to detect and identify objects on the shoulder of the road such as a
traffic sign or a pedestrian [56]. The last warning message would be a message of rank 3.
This is an alert to inform other drivers that there is a change in driving patterns. This
message could, for instance, come from a sensor monitoring the acceleration of a vehicle or
other information such as the blinker indicating a lane change.
There also exist incident messages (ranks 4-6), where it is expected to see a substantial
change in the current driving pattern to accommodate the reason for the message. These
incident messages correspond to ranks 4-6. An example of a message rank 4 is an object
detected in the road, his could be a pot hole or an animal in the road. While a message rank
5 would correspond to an emergency vehicle being detected, in some ITS initiatives there is
prioritization of emergency vehicles [57] thus it is critical to have the connected vehicles be
able to acknowledge and prepare for this type of event. The last message of rank 6 would
be for car collisions. Car accidents have the potential to seriously impact smart city ITS’s,
thus it is absolute necessary to report accidents to the smart city infrastructure such that
intelligent routing systems have the capability to reroute traffic when necessary [37]. The
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distinction between these messages and the associated driving statistics or data will be later
defined in 6.1.7.
4.4 Summary
Because the lack of vast production implementations of connected vehicles it is necessary
to virtually simulate traffic flow through SUMO. The data that SUMO is capable of produc-
ing closely models that which the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration expect to




This chapter presents the methodology applied throughout this thesis. Section 5.1 ex-
amines the construction of the behavioral model, followed by Section 5.2, thxfe behavioral
pattern identification process. Section 5.3 presents the behavioral value and trust mod-
ification. Lastly Section 5.4 discusses the updating of the behavioral model. Figure 5.1
demonstrates the significant steps of the proposed behavioral model based trust manage-
ment design implements.
5.1 Construction of a behavioral model
The steps that led to the creation of the behavioral model was divided into two distinct
phases: data collection and the compile a behavioral model.
5.1.1 Data Collection
This phase will require the collection of data regarding the specific driving statistics of
each vehicle within the localized geographical region. The focus is to collect data that is
informative and will lead to a safer environment. More details about the data is provided in
Section 6.1.6. The connected vehicle’s will the ones producing the necessary information, by
using their own sensors they will be collecting their own driving statistics while simultane-
ously collecting information on their surroundings such as road conditions. This information
will then be propagated to a nearby RSU for further processing. This is done to alleviate
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Figure 5.1 Graphical representation of each critical step describing how messages are evaluated and propa-
gated through the Behavioral model based trust management approach. Pink represents the starting location,
green represents a good behavior and red is the detection of a malfunctioning vehicle or malicious message.
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the connected vehicle from processing data while allowing for the RSU to be able to conduct
a deeper analysis of the collected data. Furthermore, this data collection process will be
continually collecting new data, and this information can then be propagated through the
system for evaluation at the later steps.
The driving statistics collected are listed below, with example data found in Figure 4.2
• Vehicle position: A value that corresponds to SUMO’s representation of the road
that the vehicle is driving on. While SUMO is limited to specific values associated with
the map assigned to the simulation, real world data could potentially correspond to the
address of the current road. Example: Main Street, Chattanooga, TN.
• Speed: In SUMO this corresponds to the instantaneous speed of the vehicle in meters
per second, however, this could be adjusted based upon the units of measurements used.
• Longitude and Latitude: This corresponds to the GPS X and Y coordinates on
the map that was used in the SUMO simulation. This is used in conjunction with the
position such that a more accurate location on the road can be obtained.
• Acceleration: The instantaneous acceleration of the vehicle at the time of sending the
message (m/s2)
• Motion State Speed: A value to supplement speed as this corresponds to the vehicle’s
speed during the time unit measured instead of the instantaneous speed when the
message was sent. This feature gives a more holistic view into the vehicle’s speed
without
• Braking Rate: This feature is the value associated with the deceleration of the vehicle
at a particular instance during the simulation (m/s2).
The collection of these features and the additional information provided by the message
rank, described in Table 4.1, provide the necessary information to build a behavioral model.
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5.1.2 Behavioral Model Design
Each message that vehicles send containing the driving statistics is processed and grouped
based on message rank. These categories of driving statistics will serve as the foundation for
the behavioral model. By designing a behavioral model for each message rank, it allows for
development of a more precise model that is necessary for evaluating messages to identify
driving statistics that do not reasonably match the behavioral model. This processing of
messages to form the behavioral model will be conducted by the RSUs that enable for the
behavioral model to be specific to the area that the RSU is located.
5.2 Behavioral Pattern Identification
After the construction of the behavioral model, the implementation of the behavioral
pattern identification process can be discussed. This again will be conducted by the RSUs
as they will 1. be collecting the driving statistics of vehicles 2. house the behavioral model.
This means that as vehicle’s are transmitting data the RSU will be collecting this data and
using the behavioral pattern identification process to compare against the behavioral model.
It has been shown that implementing two tiers of machine learning for detection can dras-
tically increase the efficiency and accuracy of the models [42], thus for the behavioral pattern
identification process, there are two distinct levels: anomaly detection and classification. The
anomaly detection aspect is designed to flag any message that is a clear malfunction or ma-
licious injection of data. Further, a classification algorithm is implemented such that any
message that is detected as an anomaly is additionally verified to determine if it is a true
anomaly or a false positive. It is critical that entire behavioral pattern identification pro-
cess still maintains the real-time detection and mitigation of threats, thus a performance
evaluation will be necessary to determine the final algorithms implemented.
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5.2.1 Anomaly Detection
To detect threats in the system it is critical to monitor the data that vehicles are transmit-
ting. To accomplish this, vehicles are required to send their driving statistics as well as a rank
that is associated with what the vehicle is currently experiencing. Malicious vehicles will
often inject data into the network with the purpose of causing havoc; while malfunctioning
vehicles will not realize they are submitting inaccurate information and thus the detection
of these intended or unintended threats in real-time is critical such that these devices can
be punished and effectively removed prior to being able to cause any harm. To monitor
this data, a machine learning approach will be implemented using the behavioral model as
a baseline; any data that does not reasonably match the known behavior of the road will be
flagged as inaccurate, resulting in the vehicle obtaining a lower trust. There are a number
of reason that a message would be flagged as an anomaly, examples include the following:
• A malfunctioning sensor would produce incorrect readings such that vehicle would send
data that does not match its driving pattern.
• A malicious vehicle could be attempting to inject data to have subsequent vehicles
rerouted so it would have the road to itself.
• The vehicle could also be driving faster than the road allows for which would be a
negative behavior and thus punishable.
Because the highly dynamic nature of connected vehicles and the messages they are
capable of sending, it was decided that there will be multiple instances of the machine
learning models where each would be uniquely trained on data corresponding to a specific
message rank that the vehicle sends. This is to say that for the list of possible message ranks
found during the simulations each have their own instance of a machine learning model that
will flag any message that does not resemble the behavioral model that it was specifically
trained on. By having these multiple machine learning models, each is able to be fine tuned
for the data that it is operating on. The behavioral model trained on car collisions will easily
be able to detect driving statistics that do not match the criteria that is expected during a
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car accident.
This portion of the behavioral model trust management design is represented by step 2 in
Figure 5.1 where if the new data matches the expected behavior then the system progresses
to step 6, or if the new data was not a match it will progress to step 3.
5.2.2 Classification
To further aid in the detection of true anomalies a classification algorithm will be used to
backup the results of the anomaly detection portion of the behavioral pattern identification
process. As was previously discussed in Table 4.1 and will be further discussed in Table
6.1, each rank of message will be associated with a specific driving pattern such that if the
behavioral pattern identification process detects an anomaly it will then send those driving
statistics to the classifier where it will be able to accurately predict which rank the driving
statistic matches. Using this classifier as a backup will increase accuracy of the overall
detection of threats, and will help safeguard against false positives that anomaly detection
algorithms are prone to generating. The classifier has the capability to relate the driving
statistics with the rank and if this predicted rank matches the vehicle’s reported rank then
the message is deemed accurate and trustworthy so the vehicle’s behavioral value can be
increased. If the classifier predicts another rank that better matches the vehicle’s driving
statistics, then it is decided to be a true anomaly and the vehicle is punished.
The classification methodology is represented by step 4 in Figure 5.1. If the message is
determined to be a false positive (where the anomaly detection algorithm made a mistake)
then the system progresses to step 6, or if the message is deemed to be a true anomaly, the
message progresses toward step 5.
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5.3 Behavioral Value
When a vehicle first enters the system and the RSU receives that vehicle’s first message
and the vehicle will be assigned a neutral trust value of 0.5, this has been referenced in
the literature and is the standard for trust management approaches [6, 7]. As the vehicle
traverses the network it will be sending communications to the RSUs at predetermined time
units. The RSUs will then evaluate these messages using the behavioral pattern identifica-
tion process, which will indicate whether or not the message subscribes to the standard or
expected behavior for the given location or incident. Based on the results of the behavioral
pattern identification process the RSU will calculate that vehicle’s behavioral value. The
mathematical formula that will be used to calculate the behavioral value (Bv) is based on
three critical values: the number of anomalies (Ac), the total number of messages (Mc), and
the rank of the message (Rm) that the vehicle has sent. The number of anomalies and total
messages will be used as a trustworthiness ratio, while the message rank (corresponding
to Table 4.1) will be used as a coefficient to dynamically change the rate that the trust is
increased or decreased. Further, the message rank (Rm) used in the formulas below is depen-
dent on the pattern identification and classification algorithms described above in Section
5.2.2. To sufficiently punish vehicles the rank used to calculate the behavioral value is the
maximum value between the actual rank the vehicle sent or what the classification algorithm
determined based on the driving statistics reported. By using the maximum value, malicious
vehicles that under-report or over-report (send low ranking messages even if their driving
statistics correspond to a higher ranking message and vice versa for over-reporting), will
both be punished equally as severely.







This equation is used upon successful matching of behavioral patterns, seen in step 6 of
Figure 5.1.
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This equation is used when the behavior is determined to be an anomaly, as shown in
step 5 in Figure 5.1.
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, it is often harder to gain trust and easy to lose trust [38],
implementation of this is presented in equations 5.1 and 5.2. By implementing the trust
generation and modification with this strategy it offers real-time mitigation of threats because
the idea that trust is easily lost.
The behavioral value must be able to appropriately remove vehicles that pose serious
threats to the system. To further combat continuously malfunctioning or malicious vehicles,
there is a mechanism that can administer a more severe punishment when necessary. To
accomplish this, the RSU initializes an anomaly counter for each vehicle such that on every
third inaccuracy the vehicle will be punished with a three times multiplier for that specific








As discussed in 3.1, trust management systems require a majority consensus as the eval-
uation of the data vehicles are sending. However, this is a problem as there are threats that
target consensus such as a colluding attack. While this implementation can alleviate poten-
tial collusions through the detection of anomalies, instances where vehicles create the illusion
of incidents (described in our threat model in section 2.4), will require a new consensus mech-
anism However, to combat traditional majority consensus approaches, an implementation of
a δ (delta) time unit will be used such that any message can be disproved through a majority
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consensus, however, this must occur within delta time units. Upon receiving the first record
of an incident, the local RSU will initialize the delta, at that time any vehicles that approach
the same position (the road location) that the incident was first reported has the potential to
disprove the initial message. After the end of delta time, the RSU determines which report
has the majority is decided to be accurate and so those that sent inaccurate data will have
their trust values retroactively punished.
Retroactively punishing vehicles must be taken more seriously than the typical form of
punishment. Injecting illusions has more potential to cause harm in the system because
vehicles have the ability to bypass the anomaly detection aspect, thus have its message
accepted as real and accurate data until otherwise proven. To accomplish this the punishment








As previously mentioned the behavioral value will be the instantaneous representation of
the vehicle’s behavior, however, this behavioral value must be integrated with trust to achieve
a more accurate representation of the vehicle’s trustworthiness. After the determination of
whether or not the vehicle has matched the expected behavior or is a true anomaly (such
that it is either malfunctioning or malicious), the RSU will increase or decrease the vehicle’s
trust value accordingly, as represented in step 7 in Figure 5.1
The increase or decrease in the trust value of a vehicle is based on the behavioral value,
as described in equation 5.5.
Tnew = Tcur ±Bv (5.5)
Lastly, after a 24 hour period the RSU will reset each vehicle’s trust value such that
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vehicles that were malfunctioning will not be forever punished, and conversely vehicles that
were trustworthy for a substantial period of time will not be held in too high of a regard to
dismiss if at any point it begins behaving maliciously.
5.4 Retraining process
Retraining of the behavioral model is necessary to prevent it from becoming stale or
outdated. When each new message is received by the RSU, the messages from the vehicles
are propagated through the system as described in Figure 5.1, such that the behavioral
pattern identification process, behavioral value calculation, and trust modification can occur.
After, the messages are compiled together again and appended to the appropriate training
set such that the behavioral model is continuously learning the behavior of vehicles. Only
messages that were determined to resemble the current pattern are appended to these training
sets (as seen in step 8 of the same figure), as anomalies have the potential to contaminate
the behavioral model and thus negatively influence the accuracy of the behavioral pattern
identification process. Further, if patterns in the geographical area change, it should not be
a drastic change but instead a slow progression that enables the behavioral patterns to be
adjusted over time without the need for complete retraining of the behavioral models.
At the start of each new day, the RSU will undergo re-training of the behavioral model
such that the new data captured from the previous day can be implemented into the current
behavioral model to prevent the model from becoming old.
5.5 Illustrated Example
The purpose of this section will be to provide an illustrated example such that a cohesive
description of the workflow can be demonstrated. Figure 5.2 shows the example simulation
where vehicle 75 is the trustworthy vehicle and vehicle 30 is malicious sending false messages.
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Figure 5.2 Example simulation data that demonstrates two vehicles, one trustworthy and the other malicious,
interactions in the system and how their associated trust values will be modified based upon the messages
sent.
5.5.1 Trustworthy Vehicle
First we will start with the trustworthy vehicle, vehicle 75. At time 0 the vehicle enters
the network and sends a message, when the message is sent the RSU will see that it has
not seen vehicle 75 before and will first initialize this vehicle in the network and assign it a
neutral trust value of 0.5. Then the RSU will begin processing the message that was sent.
The RSU will extract the ’Message’ field from the vehicle’s message and will see that the
rank is 1. This prompts the RSU to verify the driving statistics of the vehicle by sending
the communication message through the anomaly detection algorithms that are trained on
driving statistics with rank 1. Since this is the first message this could be because the
vehicle’ being turned on and providing a trivial alert stating that it is raining. Since this
is the trustworthy vehicle the behavioral pattern identification process verifies the message
as accurate and thus the RSU begins the process of calculating the behavioral value using
the equation for increasing behavior (Eq. 5.1). This is the first message that the vehicle
sends and thus the current message count for that vehicle is 1, the message was evaluated
as trustworthy thus the anomaly count is 0, the message rank for this specific message is 0.
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This gives us a behavioral value of 0.01. After this calculation occurs the RSU will then
increase the vehicle’s trust according to this behavioral value as described in equation 5.5.
This provides us with the the following calculation:
Tnew = 0.5 + 0.01 (5.7)
Thus the RSU will now recognize that the vehicle has a trust value of 0.51 or 51%.
This process is continued when vehicle 75 send the next message at time 1. This time the
message rank is 3. The RSU extracts this value and will send the communication through
the pattern identification process that is trained on driving statistics associated with rank 3
messages and because this is the trustworthy vehicle it is determined to be accurate. This
brings vehicle 75’s total message count to 2, anomaly count to 0, and the current rank of 3







Providing a behavioral value of 0.03 that is then applied to increase trust such that vehicle
75’s trust value now is 0.54 or 54%. This process will continue and all the messages will
be evaluated to true such that at the end of the simulation and all 10 messages have been
processed vehicle 75’s trust value will be 73%.
5.5.2 Malicious Vehicle
Similar to the trustworthy vehicle, vehicle 30 in this case will be sending primarily mali-
cious messages such that its behavior and trust values will be decreasing. Vehicle 30 enters
the network and sends its first message of rank 1, but to demonstrate the usefulness of the
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trustworthy ratio we will allow this message to be accepted as an anomaly. So similar to
the first steps in the trustworthy vehicle the behavioral value is calculated and the trust
value of vehicle 30 is now 0.51 or 51%. Vehicle 30 at time 1 will send a new message that
is of rank 6, the RSU will receive this message and will propagate the message through the
behavioral pattern identification process trained on messages with rank 6 and the pattern
will be deemed an anomaly and thus malicious and now the RSU will begin the process
of calculate how to punish the vehicle. Thus the total message count for this vehicle is 2,
anomaly count is 1, and the current message rank is 6. According to the behavioral value








This provides the behavioral value of 0.3. then is then applied to decrease trust by the
equation below.
Tnew = 0.51 − 0.3 (5.10)
This means at after one malicious message, the RSU will store vehicle 30’s trust value as 21%.
This process will continue and the next message the vehicle sends will also be determined to







This provides the behavioral value of 0.4, used to decrease trust by the equation below.
Tnew = 0.21 − 0.4 (5.12)
This new trust value would be a negative number, however, the system will only decrease
trust such that it is between 0% and 100% thus after two malicious messages vehicle 30’s




This chapter presents the necessary steps used for experimentation as well as the results
from simulations that address the threat models described in Section 2.4. An analysis of the
results follows each specific use case.
6.1 Experimentation setup – Simulation Setup and Design
The experimentation setup consists of loading a map layout, generation of a network file,
spawning vehicles and mobility, and configuration of the SUMO file.
6.1.1 Loading a map layout
As discussed in Section 4.2, SUMO is capable of implementing a simulation on a Open-
StreetMap (OSM) that allows for custom map to be selected. A map of downtown Chat-
tanooga was selected for the simulation as shown in Figure 6.1. OSM is able to export
manually a selected portion of the map, and will output this map to an XML file that con-
tains information such as the ID of the road, the speed limits, and the latitude and longitude
of the road.
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Figure 6.1 The map that SUMO used as the basis for simulating traffic mobility.
6.1.2 Generating network file
Through the use of the SUMO suite of tools, it is possible to convert the OSM XML file
into a network file that SUMO is able to use. This is done through the netconvert tool that
reorganizes the OSM data into lanes with the associated length of the road, speed limits,
latitude and longitude, as well as the edges of the lanes such that the intersection of lanes is
preserved from the OSM data.
6.1.3 Generating vehicles and mobility
As described in Section 4.2, SUMO represents each vehicle in the network through a
unique routing protocol that defines every step of the vehicles life in the simulation. This
information is stored in two critical files, the trips and routes file. The trips file defines the
vehicle’s depart time (the time it enters the simulation), and the lane that it will enter and
exit from while the routes correspond to each vehicles route that it will traverse through the
simulation from the starting and ending point as was defined in the trips file. Necessary to
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the creation of these two files is another tool supplied by the SUMO suite, RandomTrips.py,
a python script that accepts the network file that was converted from the OSM file and an
argument to represent the length of the simulation in seconds. The RandomTrips python
script is able to randomly generate a number of vehicles, the starting and ending location,
the departure time, as well as the route each vehicle will take. While the number of vehicles
can be tuned, generally the random trips script will stagger the spawn of vehicles such that
a new vehicle enters the system at each new time interval. While it is possible to manually
generate the necessary files, this random trips script is able to automatically generate unique
scripts without manually defining each and every vehicle’s route.
6.1.4 Configuring the SUMO file
The last step necessary prior to the running of the simulation is the creation of the
SUMO configuration file. This is how SUMO will recognize files such as the network, route,
and trips files. In the configuration there is also the option to modify the length of time
that the simulation will run, this time needs to correspond to the time that was used in
the trips and routes generation so that all vehicles will successfully be able to exit the
network upon simulation completion. If the random trips script was not used it is possible
to define which routing algorithm SUMO would implement, the available algorithms include
numerous graph traversal algorithms [58]. However, with the ease of the random trips script,
this configuration variable was not set.
SUMO allows for two forms of simulation: a back-ended process that is done via the
command line, as well as a GUI that can be used to visualize the simulation and see each
vehicle and the routes taken. An example of a GUI simulation is shown in Figure 4.1. The
GUI has the ability to slow down the simulation as well as step through each time step of
the simulation. SUMO begins by processing the routes and trips file such that the vehicles
will enter the system at the specified road and time. SUMO then linearly progresses by
incrementing the time, and thus spawning a new vehicle, as well as progressing each vehicle
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in the system at the OSM and SUMO defined appropriate speed along the route defined in
the routes file.
6.1.5 Simulation of Car Collisions
SUMO does not currently have the capabilities of implementing collisions, thus a method
to imitate a collision in SUMO was essential to the success of this work. It was decided that
through placing stop lights throughout the map that was used in the simulations would be
a sufficient representation of how vehicles approach a car collision. Vehicles will approach
a stop light and if the light were red, the vehicles would recognize this and would hit the
brakes to come to a stop. After a specified amount of time the stop light would change green
and the vehicles would continue on their way.
A smaller and more trivial simulation was designed and implemented to collect initial data
that enables an analysis such that the main simulation would successfully implement stop
light to imitate a car collision. This initial simulation was conducted on a simple intersection
with only 1 to 10 vehicles where the light would be red for 5 time units. This allowed for
vehicles to approach the light, apply the brakes to come to a complete stop, then continue
on their way.
6.1.6 Data Collection and Processing
The data collection process is vital to the evaluation of this approach as without the
necessary data to accurately describe the vehicles behavior the machine learning models
used will be limited in their ability to develop a precise representation of the behavioral
model.
As stated in Section 4.2, SUMO is capable of producing several different output files each
corresponding to a specific type of data such as vehicle emissions or raw position. Specific
to this thesis the following SUMO command was executed to obtain outputs for a single
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simulation:
sumo -c map.sumocfg --fcd-output FCD-Trace.xml --lanechange-output\
LaneChange.xml --device.ssm.probability 1 --amitran-output Trajectories.xml
The Floating Car Data (FCD) output contains the location (latitude and longitude) and
speed for every vehicle in the network at every time step, this output is similar to that of
how a GPS would report data [55]. The lane change output contained information specific
to the lane that the vehicle was currently on, the ID of the road at each timestamp [55].
The amitran output is in regard to the trajectory of the current vehicle. This include the
motionState speed of the vehicle as described in Section 4.3. The trajectory also included
the acceleration of the vehicles at each timestep. Lastly is the inclusion of a surrogate safety
measures (SSM) device, discussed in Section 4.2. The SSM device is attached to 100% of the
vehicles and is implemented to report the braking rate of each vehicle at every instance. The
SSM device that each vehicle has produces its own output that is unique to every vehicle,
thus if the simulation contained 200 cars there would be 200 SSM outputs.
SUMO outputs these files into an XML format, that are then converted into a CSV file using
a companion python script (XML2CSV.py) that comes with SUMO. To compile these results
into a single file, we used the Pandas library [59], that facilitates processing and joining these
different output files into a single standardized and uniform output that represents the entire
simulation.
6.1.7 Creating the distinction between messages
In order to simulate these messages there needed to be a distinction between the rank
and what the vehicle driving data would show. Table 6.1 shows this distinction. Some of
these values are specific to the SUMO simulation and there may be overlap between these
messages. This is attributed to the lack of: 1. real world information such as rain detection
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Table 6.1 Relation of rank to the expected driving pattern.
Rank Driving Pattern
0 Vehicle must be in motion: The acceleration must be less than 1450, and the vehicle should not
be experiencing braking.
1 No major braking (0-1): The acceleration must be less than 1450.
2 No major braking (0-1): Vehicle must be in motion. Acceleration must be less than 1450.
3 No major braking (0-1): Vehicle must be in motion. Acceleration must be greater than 1450.
4 Braking occurs (1-2): Vehicle speed must be less than 1200.
5 Heavy braking (2-3): Vehicle speed must be less than 800.
6 Major Braking (3-4.5): Vehicle speed must be less than 400.
data 2. SUMO’s capabilities are limited such that it is not possible to implement sensor data
that connected vehicles require.
Upon running over 500 simulations the overall average values of the the features were
obtained as well as the average maximum value. The maximum values were divided in
half and averaged again with the actual average values. This combination of half of the
maximum and average values provided a psuedomedian value that is used as the foundation
for division between messages and the associated ranks. This lead to the psuedomedian of
acceleration to be calculated to 1450, speed to be 1200, and braking rate to be less than
1. This psuedomedian value is necessary to represent the messages and ranks that vehicles
would be sending and be able to create a clear distinction that will be used later for our
comparison to detect misbehaving vehicles.
An example would be any rank/message that corresponds to vehicle’s not having much of
an impact while driving must have an acceleration of less than 1450. Rank and message 3 on
the other hand corresponds to a change in driving pattern such as speeding up or changing
lanes, to create a distinction with this message between the others, this message must have
an acceleration higher than the average of 1450.
Using the car crash simulation, incident were able to be simulated such that a collection
of driving statistics were collected. These driving statistics were then divided into three
separate categories as was described in Table 6.1. This division was necessary such that
there would be a clear distinction in the type of incident and the model that would represent
said incident. By clearly defining the differences in critical messages it will better aid in the
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latter behavioral pattern identification process.
After each SUMO simulation was conducted each line of the standardized output was
processed, and if the data matched the message distinction defined above in Table 6.1, the
corresponding message was appended to the message. With this, the simulation has now
successfully simulated live V2V communications complete with sensor data such as GPS,
safety devices, and a message to alert of vehicles or infrastructure of the current road or
environmental conditions.
6.1.8 Injection of Anomalies
SUMO simulations are a method that enable study of traffic mobility, because of this the
ability to simulate a vehicle that behaves abnormally is outside the scope of the SUMO im-
plementation. Thus in order for the simulation to have malicious vehicle, the data collection
process is slightly altered such that anomalies are injected into the data. This is primarily
done through the modification of the message rank. Because the distinction of messages from
Table 6.1, any message rank that does not meet those characteristics should be considered
an anomaly and the vehicle either malfunctioning or behaving maliciously. The method for
injecting anomalies is unique such that each use cases that addresses the specific threats
described from Section 2.4.
6.2 Machine Learning Model Performance Evaluation
Evaluation of the machine learning models is necessary such that the implementation
designed meets the real-time needs for detection and mitigation in threats that connected
vehicles require. To accomplish this evaluation different machine learning algorithms were
implemented for both the anomaly detection and the classification portion of the behavioral
pattern identification. For these evaluations the same training and testing data was used to
obtain results that can be compared for accuracy and time to process. The distribution of
49
messages in the training and testing data for the machine learning algorithms is shown in
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 respectively.
6.2.1 Anomaly detection
For implementation of the anomaly detection model, three algorithms were tested to de-
termine which offered the best accuracy and performance such that threats could be detected
while also maintaining the real-time demands of such a system. Robust Covariance Ellip-
tic Envelope, Local Outlier Factor (LOF), and Isolation Forest were chosen as these were
models previously shown in the literature [41, 60]. But further, Coleman et al. showed how
these different models compare in terms of accuracy in anomaly detection showing that the
Isolation Forest was best able to detect threats for a very smaller feature set. While Garcia
et al. showed that using differently sized features sets provided different accuracy’s for each
Table 6.2 Distribution of message ranks in the machine learning training data set. These messages were
obtained from over 500 simulations with each simulation containing 300-700 vehicle. The simulation was
conducted for a period of 86,400 seconds (one day).








Table 6.3 Distribution of message ranks in the machine learning testing data set. This data was obtained
from a single simulation that contained 100 vehicles, and also simulated 1 day of driving for each of the
vehicles.









Table 6.4 Performance evaluation of each of the anomaly detection algorithms
Machine learning Model Accuracy Time to Process Message (seconds)
Elliptic Envelope 89.3% 0.00258
Local Outlier Factor 80.9% 0.00385
Isolation Forest 73.6% 0.02912
model and thus re-testing of these models will be necessary to determine which model will
provide the highest accuracy for the selected feature set. Using the default parameters, each
of the models were trained on the same data and tested on the same simulation. Accuracy
and time to process results can be found in Table 6.4.
With these results described in Table 6.4, it is clear that elliptic envelope machine learning
algorithm was the most accurate but also able to process messages in 67% of the time of
LOF, and 8.9% of the time it took Isolation Forest to process the message. Since elliptic
envelope has the highest accuracy and the fastest processing time, it is the best choice for
this implementation as it meets both the accuracy and real-time requirements that connected
vehicles necessitate.
6.2.2 Classification
For this implementation three models were tested to determine which offered the best
accuracy to processing speed such that threats could be detected while also maintaining the
real-time demands of such a system. Decision trees, K nearest neighbors (KNN), Linear Sup-
port Vector Machine (LSVM), Multilayer perceptron (MLP), Random Forests were chosen
as these were models as it has been shown in the literature to have provide higher accuracy
of results, reduced false positive ratings, and require the least amount of time to process the
data in an IoT environment that is absolutely critical for the needs of this thesis [47, 48].
Furthermore these algorithms are also readily accessible through python libraries that enable
testing such that the machine learning models could be dynamically applied [2]. Using the
default parameters, each of the models were trained on the same data tested on the same
simulation. Training time, accuracy, and time to process results can be found below in Table
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Table 6.5 Performance evaluation of each of the classification algorithms
Machine learning Model Time to Train Accuracy Time to Process Message (seconds)
Decision Tree 1.39871 96% 0.00172
KNN 0.31830 74% 0.00236
LSVM 197.15077 52% 0.00170
MLP 153.94936 79% 0.00180
Random Forest 33.49497 97% 0.00835
6.5.
The time to process these messages will be used in conjunction with the elliptic Envelope
anomaly detection, so to account for this the time to process each message was calculated
through the subtraction of the time to process the message with only anomaly detection,
0.00258s according to Table 6.4.
According to Table 6.5, decision tree and random forest offer the significantly better
accuracy (96% and 97% respectively) than the other models tested, while LSVM offered the
fastest time to process the message at 0.00170 seconds, however, in a close second decision
tree’s time to process the message was 0.00172 seconds. Decision trees offer a high accuracy
that will aid in the detection process, while also supporting the real-time demands of smart
cities and connected vehicles by having the second fastest time to process messages of 0.00172
seconds.
6.2.3 Summary
The true implementation of the behavioral pattern identification system uses both the
anomaly detection algorithm as well as the classification algorithm together to enable better
detection and mitigation of threats. Upon analysis of each individual machine learning model
it was found that elliptic envelope offered the best accuracy (89.3%) and time to process each
message (0.00258 second) for the anomaly detection portion. While decision trees offered
the best performance for the classification algorithms with an accuracy of 96% and a time
to process an individual message of 0.00172 seconds. Thus to evaluate the performance both
algorithms were used together to determine the accuracy of the overall model. The same
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Table 6.6 Performance evaluation of the behavioral pattern identification system using both Elliptic Envelope
and Decision Trees machine learning models.








training and testing data was used as previous evaluation methods and the accuracy metrics
are described in Table 6.6
The results show that the implementation of the behavioral pattern identification system
offers increased accuracy that the anomaly detection algorithm alone was not able to achieve.
Furtherm, it is shown that identification of all incident messages had a 100% accuracy rating
showing that the ability of the behavioral model to accurately represent these messages
further allows the pattern identification process to detect and mitigate these threats. In
a simulation with 289 vehicles, a total number of messages sent from all the vehicles was
7,440, this provided the results described above that led to an average of 0.00430 seconds
for processing a single message1. This was based on the average results of running a day’s
simulation with 289 vehicle and a total message count of 7,440 across the entire day, which
will allow for 233 messages per second. This level of performance means that if a vehicle
sends one message every minute, this implementation would be able to sustainable process
of nearly 14,000 vehicles’ data and driving statistics
6.3 System evaluation under the threat model
To evaluate the system, use cases were designed in such a way to demonstrate the capa-
bilities of this approach as well as imitate the threat models that were described above in
section 2.4. The use cases are divided into two sections, the first being the detection and
mitigation of malfunctions or obvious anomalies such as a vehicle driving on the interstate at
1This performance resulted from a late model AMD Ryzen 1700X x86-64 processor at 4.2Ghz.
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70mph but reporting a wreck without any drastic changes in driving patterns. Each of these
simulations contains 5 vehicles where each vehicle remained in the system for 50 time units
(minutes) transmitting their driving statistics and messages at the top of the minute. The
second area of uses cases involves the malicious actor creating the illusion that the reported
event actually occurred. This is to say that the vehicle’s driving statistics show that the
event occurred and it was not detected as an anomaly, but upon consensus from the near by
vehicles it is apparent that the event did not occur. These simulations also were ran with 5
vehicles where each of the vehicles remained in the system for either 20 or 25 minutes, also
transmitting their driving statistics and messages at the top of the minute.
6.3.1 Use case: Good vehicle
This use case was designed to simulate all vehicles operating in a trustworthy fashion. All
vehicles will enter the simulation at the same time and will transmit the message associated
with their driving pattern (as described in Table 6.1) without any modification. This is the
foundational simulation that demonstrates how the standard vehicle will gain trust in the
system, when there are no other malicious vehicles present.
6.3.1.1 Analysis
We can see that all vehicles trust steadily rise in the system. Because the vehicle’s are
primarily sending warning messages, that have lower ranks their trust increases slow but
steadily. Vehicle 5 is the first to reach a 100% trust value after 28 messages, while at time
31, vehicle 3 had only reached 95% trust. We can see that vehicle 3 had some messages that
were detected to be an anomaly (such as time 17, 27, 30) but because of the lower ranking
messages it was not a significant impact to the overall trust value.
54
Figure 6.2 Trust value results from simulation with 5 vehicles accurately reporting driving statistics
6.3.2 Use case: Bad Vehicles
This bad vehicle use case illustrates how trust decreases in the system when the vehicles
behave maliciously. All five vehicles in this simulation enter the system at time 0 with a
trust value of 0.5 and begin driving through the system exactly as use case 1 (implying a
standard driving pattern), however, instead of the correct messages that were described in
Table 6.1, each vehicle will send malicious messages were each vehicle will correspond to a
specific message. This is to say that vehicle 1 will be sending false messages that correspond
to a 1, while vehicle 2 will be sending false messages with a rank of 2, etc.
6.3.2.1 Analysis
It can be seen that the first message that the system receives is determined to be an
anomaly and the vehicles are all punished. Because of the high-ranking messages that the
vehicles send, their trust values are negatively effected as was discussed in 5.2. This shows
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Figure 6.3 Trust value results from simulation with 5 vehicles maliciously reporting driving statistics
that the system is able to effectively mitigate new malicious actors instantaneously such that
they are not able to negatively affect the system. These results show that the detection and
mitigation properties of this system are able to operate in real-time.
6.3.3 Use case: Breakout Fraud Threat Simulation
This use case will be used to show how the system reacts during attempted breakout
fraud as described in Section 2.4. Vehicles will send accurate and trustworthy messages up
until a certain point at which the same vehicles will begin acting malicious sending false
messages through the remainder of the simulation. This use case is important because it will
demonstrate how quickly the system is able to punish those vehicles that have been accurate
leading up unto that point. This is necessary because vehicles that have high trust will have
more influence and thus be relied upon more and if they are to begin acting maliciously it
could cause serious harm.
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Figure 6.4 Trust value results from simulation of vehicles committing breakout fraud as described in section
2.4.1. Where vehicle send messages to gain trust, then begin sending malicious messages
6.3.3.1 Analysis
The results clearly show that each of the five vehicles are sending accurate and trustworthy
messages the first half of the simulation as the results mimic that of the use case 1: the good
simulation. But it can be seen that at time 26, the vehicle’s trust begins dropping, by
timestamp 30, only 4 messages later the vehicles went from a 100% trust to 40% effectively
removing themselves from the system. Just another 3 messages later at timestamp 33 the
vehicles are at below 10% trust values. In just 8 minutes the vehicles went from having
achieved the highest possible trust to having earned the lowest trust of 0%. It can be seen
that through the trust formula equations 5.1 and 5.2, there exists some headroom for vehicles
that have a high trust factor. But this is to be expected as those vehicles have proven that
they were trustworthy should not be hastily punished for sending messages that could be
because of a simple misreading of the sensor.
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6.3.4 Use case: Comeback Simulation
A comeback use case is to simulate when vehicles experience malfunctions in sensors
that would cause them to send inaccurate data thus impacting their trust negatively. But
at any point the sensors becomes fixed and the vehicle begins sending accurate data. To
simulate this, vehicles will send inaccurate messages the first half of the simulation, then the
second half the vehicles will begin sending accurate messages. This use case again shows how
quickly trust can be decreased such that vehicles sending inaccurate data will be a threat
to the system similar to that of use case with bad behavior, but it will also show how trust
is regained after the problem is resolved. While aimed at malfunctioning vehicles, this use
case also demonstrates how a malicious vehicle would regain trust in the system and how
difficult it is to regain trust after it has been lost.
Figure 6.5 Trust value results from simulation of vehicles attempt to re-gain trust after losing it from sending
several malicious messages
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6.3.4.1 Analysis of the primary comeback simulation
This simulation begins with the all vehicles sending malicious messages for the first 25
messages. We expect this to mimic the results from use case 2, however, it can see that
vehicle 5 experiences a gain in trust at time 1. This is an acceptable gain for these simulations
because it’s most likely because the vehicle reporting that it is stationary and holding the
brakes that matches the criteria of a car crash. But upon all five vehicles reaching 0% trust
value, they continue sending inaccurate messages that do not match their driving statistics
thus decreasing their trustworthiness ratio even further. At timestamp 25 the vehicles begin
sending accurate messages that does not impact their trust until a few messages later which
is attributed to the low trustworthiness ratio. These results also demonstrate that because
vehicle 5’s initial messages were accepted for the first few instances, it was able to increase
it’s trust a full four messages sooner than the next vehicles were able to. But it can be seen
that when the vehicles were gaining trust and sending accurate messages it took vehicle 5 to
10 messages before it was able to obtain 10% trust demonstrating that if a vehicle has been
persistently untrustworthy it takes numerous messages to be evaluated in order to have a
small effect on the trust values. Vehicle 1 also demonstrates that even if you are beginning to
gain trust again then send an inaccurate message that the trust which took over 10 messages
to gain 10%, can be lost in just one minor inaccuracy. As was discussed in 3.1.1 it is hard
to gain trust but easy to lose trust, and whenever you lose trust it’s even harder to gain it
back.
In addition to the initial comeback simulation, there is also an additional version of this
that is used to simulate malicious vehicles that realize that all other vehicles are disregarding
its messages, it will begin to send accurate data in hopes to gain enough trust such that other
vehicles would be impacted by its messages. But in order to gain trust quickly the malicious
vehicle will only reporting incident messages that have a higher rank. The reporting of
critical incident messages is done so as an attempt to gain trust as quickly as possible and
while not sending other messages. This is important because again it will show how trust is
regained in the system but through sparse incident message evaluation instead of the warning
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Figure 6.6 Trust value results from a simulation of vehicles attempting to quickly re-gain trust after losing
it from sending several malicious messages
messages that are not high ranking.
6.3.4.2 Analysis of the secondary comeback simulation
Here we can see that this simulation and results correspond closely to the initial comeback
results. The first few messages passing as success is not great but can be attributed to the
lack of additional sensor data that could’ve provided more insight into whether it was a
wreck or just the vehicle being stationary after ignition. After that the results quickly show
that the vehicle’s trust value drastically diminishes down to 0% again. Then we can see
that about half way through the simulation vehicles begin sending messages that were being
evaluated to accurate and trustworthy. What we see now is that the vehicles go through
comparatively steeper increases when compared to the previous comeback use case. However,
with the sparsity of the incident messages these steeper increases in trust only occur once
every four of five messages. By using this tactic as an attempt to increase the trust of the
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vehicles is shown to be ineffective as each of these high ranking messages only increase the
trust by at most 5 to 6% at a time.
6.3.5 Use case: Selective Behavior (Flip-Flopping)
The Flip-Flop use case will be used to describe the trust of vehicles that will switch
from sending good message to sending bad messages on a set schedule as an attempt to
disrupt the system while simultaneously attempting to maintain a high enough trust to be
listened to. This simulation also demonstrates how a vehicle’s trust would be impacted if a
specific sensor on the vehicle were to begin malfunctioning. Since every message would not
require every single sensor’s data, one specific sensor could be malfunctioning that would go
undiscovered for a few instances upon which it is required to send data. This data would
cause the message to be flagged as an anomaly and thus the vehicle would be punished. To
simulate this all vehicles will begin the simulation and then all simultaneously start sending
good messages then flip to sending bad messages. This flip-flop of behavior could occur after
any set amount of time, specifically three messages, but in a very predictable manner. In
this case, the flip flop decision of three messages was selected as it would provide enough
occurrences where it is easily displays that as time progresses trust dynamically becomes
easier to lose while harder to gain.
6.3.5.1 Analysis
As stated above, this simulation involves the first three messages being sent to be accurate
and trustworthy, in the results it can be seen that the trust increases during these three
messages before the vehicle begins sending false data. Because of the nature of the data
being sent the trust value is drastically decreased to 0% after just another three messages.
The increase in trust values between the vehicles ranges between 2% and 6%. But those
vehicles that do not send higher ranking messages such as vehicle 3 and vehicle 4 require three
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Figure 6.7 Trust value results from a simulation of vehicles tha frequently switch from sending accurate
messages to malicious messages
messages to obtain a 2 or 3% trust value and just a single message to drop the trust value back
to zero. Because of the drastic decrease capabilities that the implement behavioral-based
formula if these results are detected they can most likely be attributed to a malfunctioning
sensor.
6.3.6 Use case: Selective Behavior (Mixed)
Mixed behavior is an extension of Flip-Flop but instead of being in a set schedule, a
vehicle will spontaneously send a false message at any point in the simulation. The flip flop
use case can be used to derive another involving mixing of behaviors. This form of mixed
behavior can be attributed to any number of scenarios such as a malicious vehicle attempting
to build trust to where it can send a malicious incident message and then return to sending
good messages such that it retains a high trust value. This use case can be attributed to
that similar to the flip flop a specific sensors on a vehicle being broken that whenever it
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has to report data causes the trust implementation to punish said vehicle because the data
is inaccurate. This use case will be simulated by a vehicle sending false messages but at
first sending inaccurate message sparsely but as time progresses the vehicle will be sending
primarily false messages.
Another use case will be the completely mixed behavior. The vehicles will randomly
decide when to send malicious messages or the vehicle would experience a degradation of
a critical sensor such as a speedometer. This use case will demonstrate how the system is
managed when the malicious devices begin acting in a random fashion.
Both of these use cases are critical as they show how trust is impacted by a malfunctioning
sensors or malicious vehicles sending inaccurate messages as the time in the simulation
proceeds.
Figure 6.8 Trust value results from a simulation of vehicles that demonstrate progression toward becoming
increasingly more malicious
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6.3.6.1 Analysis of the primary mixed behavior simulation
Here we can see that the vehicles begin the simulation with an increasing trust value. Then
at time 5, all vehicles will send an inaccurate message that are evaluated to be an anomaly.
This one anomaly takes their trust from 62% to 53% (because of the trustworthiness ratio
we do not expect to see their trust value be completely diminished). After this one anomaly,
the vehicles will continue again with sending five accurate messages. Increasing their trust
15%, followed by now two anomalous messages thus decreasing their trust to a range of
9-16%. These two additional anomalies have changed their associated trustworthiness ratio
from 1:10 to 3:13 that demonstrate a decrease in trust by approximately 50% effectively
removing them from consideration as their trust does not meet the criteria to contribute to
the decision making process. With the now higher trustworthiness ratio the trust values of
the vehicles are not capable of rising above 10% in the five messages sent. It can be see
that after the trustworthiness ratio increases to nearly a quarter, anomalies are drastically
impacted such that only one anomaly is able to diminish any trust the vehicles were able to
build during that time.
6.3.6.2 Analysis of secondary mixed behavior simulation
Because of the randomness of this simulation results displayed have a significant difference
in other use cases shown in this work. Each of these vehicles can be explained through a
number of reasons. Vehicle 1 has initial decreases in trust and by time 3 is already down to
almost 30%. But after another thirty messages with only a few minor complications vehicle
1 is able to achieve a trust of 90%. Vehicle 1 then sends a couple of malicious messages and
by the end of the simulation has an overall trust value of 70%. Vehicle 2 and 3 follow a
similar pattern where there is an initial increase in trust followed by an anomalous message
that decreases both trust values by approximately the same 15%. Vehicle 3 continues to
send messages with a few anomalies such that its trust value hovers around 60-70%. Vehicle
2, however, proceeds to primarily send trustworthy messages thus is able to increase it’s
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Figure 6.9 Trust value results from a simulation of vehicle that will randomly injecting malicious data
trust to 97%, nearly a perfect trust value. Vehicle 5 on the other hand primarily sends
accurate messages with a small number of complications that leads it to earning a 100%
trust value after only 33 messages. Vehicle 4, however, starts off quite negatively, almost
entirely maintaining a trust value below 40% up until message 26. At which point vehicle 4
changes paths to sending primarily positive messages and is able to increase its trust value
almost to that of the others at a 62%.
These results are absolutely sporadic, however, because of the nature of connected vehicle
data and how highly dynamic the environment is it is reasonable to assume that there will be
instances when the data and sensors report data that does not match the expected behavior
that was collected for the training models. It is, however, expected to quite random but
generally follow a path upwards, which these results display as all trust values of the vehicles
increase to above 60% with two reaching nearly perfect trust.
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6.3.7 Use case: Illusion-based Simulation
This use case will be used to show how the system reacts during illusion based messages
as described in Section 2.4.3, where a malicious vehicle creates the illusion of an incident
by imitating the driving statistics of said incident (described in 6.1). These use cases are
critical to the evaluation of the consensus mechanism implemented described in 5.3.1. Each
of these cases will involve one illusionist with the other four vehicles following behind said
illusionist.
The first use case will be used as a baseline for a working consensus mechanism. The
illusionist will report illusion based messages simulating a wreck even if one is not present.
Then the four vehicles following the illusionist will also report a car collision such that the
illusionist’s trust is not negatively impacted.
The second use case will again contain the illusionist sending illusion based messages but
following directly behind it are four vehicles that will not report an accident. This will show
how the consensus mechanism is able to retroactively punish the vehicle in the same time
unit the messages were received. This is to say that the illusionists trust value increases
as it’s message was processed first. Then the follower vehicles come in and report that the
message was incorrect and the system will then retroactively punish the illusionist, while the
four following vehicles all gain trust.
The third use case for illusion based messages involves the demonstration of the delta
described in 5.3.1. Again there is one illusionist creating the illusion of incidents when they
do not exist, with four other vehicles following behind. However, in this case, the four
vehicles following behind are approximately five time units back. This means the illusionist
will not be disproved for a few time units. When the follower vehicles arrive to the location
of the reported incident the consensus mechanism will be activated, and the trust of the
vehicle should decrease.
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Figure 6.10 Trust value results from a simulation of vehicles that demonstrate a majority consensus
6.3.7.1 Analysis of a majority agreement consensus simulation
With the nature of this simulation being the base case for the further Illusion based
threats, trusts here model use good vehicle’s use case presented in section 6.3.1, where there
is a constant increase to the point all vehicles are able to reach 100%. The simulation in
this case demonstrates that the consensus mechanism was successfully able to agree with the
illusionist such that all trust values increase without any retroactive punishments.
6.3.7.2 Analysis of majority disagreement simulation
As discussed this use case is used to demonstrate the ability to punish illusionists based
upon a consensus that the incident reported did not occur. It can be seen that vehicle
1 at time 1 has a trust value of 25%. This does not match the results from use case 2,
because consensus mechanism relies on retroactively punishing vehicles. Meaning that at
time 1, all data from time 0 has been processes such that vehicle 1’s trust was initially
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Figure 6.11 Trust value results from a simulation where a leading vehicle is against the majority consensus
increased, but then was quickly disproved by the follower vehicles such that vehicle 1 was
then retroactively punished. Further, the high trustworthiness ratio that vehicle 1 has (as its
first message was not an anomaly) the trust value does not instantly drop to 0%. Following
this initial decrease, the illusionist proceeds to send more illusion based messages that are
disproved by the follower vehicles. The following vehicles are able to steadily increase their
trust while the illusionist is effectively removed from the system.
6.3.7.3 Analysis of delayed majority disagreement simulation
This use case is an extension where there is still one illusionist and four follower vehicles.
Except this time the following vehicles are 5 time units behind. Thus giving way to further
testing of the consensus mechanism and ability to retroactively punish vehicles. Figure 6.12
clearly displays that vehicle 1, the illusionist, is driving along the road sending illusions that
fools the system into increasing the trust value of the vehicle. However, when the follower
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Figure 6.12 Trust value results from a simulation where there is a delay in the disagreement on the majority
consensus
vehicles arrive to the location that the illusionist reported an incident, they do not detect
that incident that was reported and is flagged by the consensus mechanism. This enables
retroactively punishment the illusionist for the vehicle that was sent at time 0 because it
was proven that there was no incident. The results clearly show this occurs at time 5 where
vehicle 1’s trust drops nearly 70% in just 2 retroactive punishments. These results clearly




We offer conclusions and mention future work here.
7.1 Closing Thoughts
This work has shown that: the collection of a vehicle’s driving statistics allows for the
creation of a behavioral model that describes how vehicles in a given geographical location
behave; using a two-tier machine learning model it is possible to detect malicious behavior
in real-time and with over 90% accuracy; and through this detection process, a behavioral
value can be calculated using the vehicle’s trustworthiness ratio such that this behavioral
value can be used as an update to the vehicle’ trust value to further aid traditional trust
management approaches.
This design sought to build onto the weaknesses that current trust management systems
suffer from, these weaknesses include the punishment of malicious actors in real time as well
as mitigating colluding attacks which seek to exploit traditional consensus mechanisms. In
current trust management approaches, when a majority of vehicles in the network are mali-
cious and injecting inaccurate data into the system, then there is no method that validates
the data that these vehicles are sending but instead solely rely on the consensus of data to
update the trust values.
Furthermore, the behavioral based trust management approach was designed which im-
plemented three distinct contributions to trust management: the construction of a behavioral
model, a behavioral pattern identification process, and a behavioral value. Through detailed
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data collection a behavioral model can be designed for a localized area which accurately
represents the standard behavior of vehicles within the area. Then a behavioral pattern
identification system was constructed which utilized two forms of machine learning, anomaly
detection and classification algorithms which when new messages from vehicles were input,
the data would be extracted and compared to the behavioral model that was previously
created. Through this analysis of data any vehicle whose driving statistics do not match
the standard or expected behavior will be classified as an anomaly, as an additional layer
of protection these anomalies would then be processed by the classification algorithm which
would determine if the driving statistics correspond to the vehicle’s message (i.e., a false pos-
itive), or if the message is a true anomaly. Lastly after the behavioral pattern identification
system, a behavioral value would be calculated. This behavioral value is based upon the
trustworthiness ratio, which is defined as the number of anomalies per the total messages
the vehicle has transmitted, as well as the current messages rank. These two components
allows for vehicle’s who have a low trustworthiness ratio quickly be able to lose trust while
simultaneously making it harder to gain trust. While also making vehicle’s who have a high
trustworthiness ratio to not be critically punished on the first inaccurate message it has sent.
This behavioral based trust management trust approach has been shown to detect and
mitigate threats which other trust management approach suffer from such as: breakout
fraud, selective behavior, illusion-based attacks, and colluding attacks. Results show that
these threats were mitigated in real-time while not overly punishing trustworthy vehicles
who make mistakes.
7.2 Future Work
Future work for this project can be found below, Section 7.2.1 discusses how real world
connected vehicle data would have benefited this work, Section 7.2.2 described how a block-
chain implementation would protect data, followed by Section 7.2.3 where a potential accu-
racy rating would also be applied to trust modification.
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7.2.1 Real World Implementation
One of the shortcomings of this work is the simulation of traffic. SUMO was satisfactory
and allowed for successful modeling of traffic and connected vehicles, but using a software
based application that simulated traffic and imitate collisions can certainly be improved
if it were to use real world connected vehicle data. NHTSA stated that the stated the
sensors and communication devices could be added to vehicles for as little as $350, so with
potential funding it would be possible to convert a vehicle into a connected vehicle and obtain
production grade connected vehicle data. Furthermore testing this implementation on true
edge devices instead of a desktop would provide more insightful results for the performance
evaluations of the different machine learning models and how this approach would behave
under those circumstances.
7.2.2 Secure Decentralized Trust Database
Trust management approaches are able to mitigate threats a vehicle is behaving mali-
ciously for a period of time. However if a malicious actor were to hack the device storing
the trust values of all vehicles and modify them to all having a 100% then the mitiga-
tion of threats is completely irrelevant. In our previous works we have demonstrated that
connected vehicles and smart cities are capable of generating and maintaining a lightweight
blockchain [22]. A blockchain implementation would aid in the decentralized approach, while
providing key features such as tamper-proofing and consistency of the data. I believe there
would also be potential for storage of the behavioral model on a blockchain which could have
potential for data analysis upon the behavior of the vehicle across its lifetime instead of just
a 24 hour period.
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7.2.3 Behavioral Value and Trust Modification Evaluation
In current trust management approach as well as this work, a message is evaluated as
either trustworthy or not. With this work, an additional security layer has been added that
is able to evaluate the data that is being transmitted. By evaluating this data the behavioral
value formula for modifying doesn’t have to be a pure true or false. The classification machine
learning algorithm is able to classify messages which were anomalies that would enable for
an accuracy rating of anomalies to be applied. That is, a vehicle that are reporting a
car collision but are potentially driving too fast will be evaluated as an anomaly and thus
punished for lying about a car crash, instead the classification algorithm would see that the
vehicle’s message’s rank was off by a rank of one or two, and thus not be severely punished
but instead have their trust decreased at a lesser amount. Doubts remain regarding this
strategy, however, because it could potentially not mitigates threats to the system fast
enough to where those malicious vehicles would be able to send several messages (which
could negatively impact the system).
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